Wednesday, November 13, 2019
Turing: Concept of Computation :: Computers Computational Systems Papers
Turing: Concept of Computation Turing's analysis of the concept of computation is indisputably the foundation of computationalism, which is, in turn, the foundation of cognitive science. What is disputed is whether computationalism is explanatorily bankrupt. For Turing, all computers are digital computers and something becomes a (digital) computer just in case its 'behavior' is interpreted as implementing, executing, or satisfying some (mathematical) function 'f'. As 'computer' names a nonnatural kind, almost everyone agrees that a computational interpretation of this sort is necessary for something to be a computer. But because everything in the universe satisfies at least one (mathematical) function, it is the sufficiency of such interpretations that is the problem. If, as anticomputationalists are fond of pointing out, computationalists are wedded to the view that a computational interpretation is sufficient for something to be a computer, then everything becomes a digital computer. This not only renders comput er-talk vacuous, it strips computationalism of any empirical or explanatory import. My aim is to defend computationalism against charges that it is explanatorily bankrupt. I reexamine several fundamental questions about computers. One effect of this computation-related soul-searching will be a framework within which 'Is the brain a computer?' will be meaningful. Another effect will be a fracture in the supposed link between computationalism and symbolic-digital processing. If the standard by which to measure the explanatory value of a view were its revolutionary character, then Turing's (1936) analysis of the concept of computation would be highly valued indeed. Whereas the science of mind was once dominated by behaviorists, today it is dominated by computationalists. For computationalists, the mind/brain is a computer. As computationalists came to shoulder the burden for explaining how the mind/brain works, Turing's analysis of what counts as a computer became the standard by which to justify empirical claims about whether something is a computer. According to Turing, all computers are digital computers and something becomes a (digital) computer just in case its "behavior" is interpreted as implementing, executing, or satisfying some (mathematical) function 'f'. Because Turing's analysis is considered the foundation of computationalism, which, in turn, is the foundation of cognitive science, there can be no doubt that Turing's analysis has revolutioni zed the scientific study of the mind/brain. That much is not in dispute. What is, rather, is whether computationalism is explanatorily bankrupt. Although attacks against computationalism come in a variety of flavors, what bridles Searle (1990) and other anticomputationalists the most is the sufficiency of Turing's analysis of what counts as a computer.
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